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This article focuses on the development 
of peaceful nuclear power. The author draws 
attention to the fact that nuclear power is a 
rather young branch of national economy. 
However, over recent decades, it has already 
seen rises and falls, and a number of states 
have had tragic experiences of nuclear emer-
gencies. Nevertheless, many countries — in-
cluding the three Baltic States of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania — express a strong in-
terest in development, generation, and appli-
cation of nuclear power. In the Baltic States, 
nuclear power dates back to the Soviet times, 
but its development was suspended pursuant 
to the EU regulations (the Ignalina NPP). 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have been 
striving for energy independence from Rus-
sia — the principal supplier of energy carri-
ers to these countries. For a long time, the 
three Baltic States have been proclaiming 
their unanimity on the general European 
path of development. However, the reality 
proved to be different. The touchstone for 
achieving common goals was the idea of con-
structing a new NPP at the site of the closed 
Ignalina NPP. 
The author concludes that the joint con-
struction of a new NPP is quite questionable. 
When it comes to politics, each of the three 
Baltic States is ready to build its own NPP. 
Thus, the development of nuclear power in 
the Baltic Sea region requires joint coordi-
nated actions independent of any bloc-in-
spired interests of the states involved. More-
over, this success may prove sustainable if 
the actions are based on innovative decisions 
and modern technologies. 
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The production of nuclear energy be-
gan over five decades ago. Over this pe-
riod of time, the development of this sec-
tor on a global scale has been signifi-
cantly influenced by both system-related 
and natural factors, which has considera-
bly affected this process both at the level 
of intergovernmental institutions and in-
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dividual states regardless of their geographical or political positions. At the 
same time, the attitude towards the peaceful use of nuclear energy has never 
been questioned. 
Over the given period, the exploitation of nuclear energy has seen rises 
and falls. There are objective reasons behind it. The most radical changes 
started in the 1980s, when the global oil crisis caused oil prices to plummet 
(1986) coinciding with the Chernobyl disaster. It drew the international at-
tention to the environmental problems, which led to the signing of the Kyoto 
treaty. Furthermore, the technological revolution resulted in the creation of 
hydrocarbon field development technology and contributed to lower cost and 
higher efficiency of energy and raw material production and consumption. 
Getting a little bit ahead of myself, I cannot but notice that, at that moment, 
rallies against the launch of the third and fourth units of the Ignalina NPP 
took place (the third unit was ready by 60—70 %) so the construction was 
suspended and the unit was dismantled. 
In the mid-2000s, there was a short period characterised by stable energy 
supply and evolutionary changes to markets and technologies. Oil became 
the most demanded raw material, despite the increasing and rather high oil 
prices. In Europe, the public interest in nuclear energy began to wane. 
Against this background, the EU’s decision to close the Ignalina NPP in 
Lithuania was hardly noticed in Europe. 
The continuing growth in energy consumption was still catered for by 
fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal). Simultaneously, the advocates and 
producers of renewable energy became more active. Then, nuclear energy 
began to attract public attention again, which coincided with the launch of 
the European campaign for energy market liberalisation. 
Everything changed on March 11, 2011, when a series of earthquakes 
did not only result in a nuclear disaster in Japan, but also affected the situa-
tion on the world energy markets and changed strategic outlooks on further 
energy development. 
A natural change took place in European public opinion on the develop-
ment of nuclear energy. An adjustment of nuclear policy was required, espe-
cially in nuclear energy producing countries. First of all, stricter technologi-
cal requirements for the construction and operation of NPPs were intro-
duced. Under the influence of the “green”, Germany made a decision to ter-
minate the operation of all NPPs in the near future. German energy experts 
found themselves in the vanguard of an active transition to exploiting renew-
able power sources. At the same time, the means of hydrocarbons transporta-
tion started to change (the tanker transportation of natural gas started to gain 
popularity). 
At the same time, one cannot but take into account the fact that new 
technologies of power generation per se are not cost-intensive. Moreover, 
the intentions of, for instance, the Baltic States to use liquefied gas will be 
implemented in view of the fact that a negative attitude towards the use of 
nuclear energy developed in Japan almost immediately after the Fukushima 
disaster. This circumstance and the closure of other Japanese NPPs resulted 
G. Kretinin 
 33
in a significant growth in liquefied gas consumption1. A possible reaction to 
such processes could be a reduction in “free” volumes of liquefied gas on the 
world market. Its price will increase. 
One must take into account that the reconstruction of the Baltic States’ 
gas industries is possible only with the financial support of the European Un-
ion. However, the events in southern Europe — the gradual subsidence of 
Greece and Cyprus into a pre-bankruptcy state, and similar expectations in 
the case of Italy, Spain, and Portugal — have required significant financial 
contributions from the EU, which will result in a reduction in the funding of 
other programmes, including those in the north and north-east of Europe. 
It is well-known that the “sponsor” of the salvation in southern Europe is 
Germany. Having listened to the “green” and abandoned nuclear energy, 
A. Merkel’s government focused on the development of renewable energy. 
However, just a few years ago, Germany’s fuel mix was 30.5 % nuclear en-
ergy and just 2 % renewables [2]. As of today, not much has changed. Ger-
many — having announced the closure of its NPPs, which accounted for one 
third of the total energy generated — has to create backup supplies of energy 
produced by solar and wind systems, as well as that produced at coal-fuelled 
CHPPs. Experts believe that, this way or another, German energy specialists 
will turn to nuclear energy [3]. 
According to the mass media, the problem of alternative energy is rather 
cost-intensive. In the EU, state-run programmes for supporting alternative 
energy are being disrupted. There is a reduction in investment in small and 
medium-scale projects (the use of biomass or waste as fuel) by private inves-
tors. In 2012, investment in biomass and waste processing reduced by 27 %; 
at the same time, solar and wind energy lost 9 and 13 % respectively [4]. 
However, according to the management of the French corporation Areva, 
the post-Fukushima crisis is calming down in Japan. Until the end of 2013, 
Japan may launch five or six reactors. Even in Europe, according to the di-
rector general of Areva, Luc Oursel, there are much more countries that sup-
port nuclear energy than those that oppose it [5]. 
Among those who think favourably of nuclear energy are the Baltic 
States, which are experienced in using the peaceful atom. 
In the Soviet times, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia cherished the idea of 
energy independence. However, this idea was difficult to implement. 
A number of attempts had been made to carry out various projects such as 
the construction of a hydropower plant network on lowland rivers and the 
construction of an CHPPs fuelled by local raw materials — peat and shale. 
Finally, in the 1960s — 1970s, the Soviet command-and-control system 
made a decision to construct large energy producing facilities — the Baltic 
and Estonian power plants and the Elektrėnai CHPP. 
                                                     
1 In particular, in the beginning of 2013, the largest in Japan Tokyo Electric Power 
Company announced its plans to purchase 800 thousand tons of liquefied gas in the 
USA. In the near future, this volume will increase up to 2m tons with a prospective 
growth of up to 10m tons [1].  
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The new stage of energy development was closely connected with the in-
tegration of these republics’ systems into the united energy system of the 
North-West USSR and the construction of a nuclear power plant in the Bal-
tic. At first, it was planned to be constructed in the Vitebsk region, but later 
it was moved to Lithuania, in an area bordering on Belarus. Lithuanians tried 
to protest against it, but these attempts were futile. The modern history of 
Lithuania began, in which the Ignalina NPP had to become the largest power 
generator. 
Finally, the “gift” of a NPP forced on Soviet Lithuania turned out to be 
the latter’s property in the 1990s; it ensured, to a great degree, energy inde-
pendence of not only Lithuania, but also its Baltic neighbours. 
This circumstance — energy independence — has become a special con-
cern for the political leadership throughout the period of the republics’ inde-
pendent development. Naturally, after the Baltic States’ accession to the EU, 
their energy policy was aimed at solving this very problem. At the same 
time, energy security was strongly influenced by distancing from Russian 
energy, and the secession from the unified energy system and orientation of 
the local energy sectors towards the European standards. 
Energy independence from Russia was to be achieved through compre-
hensive measures: the construction of a new NPP, the creation of interna-
tional transmission lines, the construction of (an) LNG terminal and, finally, 
ruling Gazprom out of managing the natural gas transmission across the re-
publics. 
The most consistent and even aggressive “fighter” for energy independ-
ence was Lithuania. Thus it was commissioned to construct an NPP. The 
idea of constructing a new NPP was being explored as the date of the closure 
of the Ignalina NPP was drawing near. However, Lithuania was unable to 
implement such a project on its own but the European Union was unwilling 
to support it. Thus a decision was made to create a consortium with the par-
ticipation of Lithuania’s immediate neighbours and invite a foreign investor. 
At the same time, the major sentiment was as follows: under no conditions 
Russia’s help was to be used in the project implementation. 
In 2010—2011, the first problems arose. At first, Poland refused to par-
ticipate in the project: it was not satisfied with the distribution of future ca-
pacities. At the same time, Warsaw started developing plans of constructing 
two NPPs at the Baltic Sea. Later, the major investor — a Southern Korean 
company — suddenly left the project. 
The Japanese company Hitachi Nuclear — a brand behind the technol-
ogy used at the infamous Fukushima-1 NPP — became the new investor. 
Despite all the efforts, Vilnius did not manage to create a positive image of 
the Japanese investor in Lithuania and in the neighbouring countries. Latvia 
and Estonia did not only object, but also developed proposals on implement-
ing their own nuclear projects. No one was eager to give unqualified ap-
proval. The project completion was rescheduled for 2020—2022. 
A serious damage to the image of the Lithuanian project was inflicted by 
the Russian idea of constructing an NPP on the territory of the Kaliningrad 
region. The management of Lithuania’s energy sector could not clearly ex-
G. Kretinin 
 35
plain either to the republic’s politicians or to the population the advantages 
of their project and the shortcomings of the Russian project of an NPP of a 
greater capacity, which is being constructed twice as rapidly (it is to be com-
pleted in 2016—2018). The obstruction of the Baltic NPP by mass media 
could only create distrust of the Russian project in the Lithuanian society, 
which, however, did not affect its construction. 
At the same time, opposition to the local NPP construction was growing 
in Lithuania — the more so that it was to be built by a Japanese company 
with a major failure on its record. As a result, there arose a need to hold a 
referendum on the construction of the Visaginas NPP. 
Ambiguous attitude to the construction of the Visaginas NPP was regis-
tered in the Lithuanian political circles. Conservatives were the convinced 
advocates of the project, whereas social democrats, who won the election, 
insisted that the opinion of the citizens to be expressed in the forthcoming 
referendum should be taken into account. 
The referendum took place on October 14, 2012, and the population ex-
pressed their negative attitude towards the nuclear project. Later, the Lithua-
nian leadership emphasised that the referendum results were to be inter-
preted as recommendations necessary for further assessment of the situation 
and that another referendum could be held in the future. The President and 
the Prime Minister of Lithuania paid official visits to Lithuania’s neighbours 
trying to understand the attitudes of Riga and Tallinn towards the future of 
the Visaginas NPP [6]. 
It seems that the summit meeting did not yield any tangible results. But 
Vilnius has to make a decision. With a high degree of certainty, one can ex-
pect that it will be positive, because the NPP construction is strongly sup-
ported by President Dalia Grybauskaitė. But, as she said, the construction of 
the Visaginas NPP would take at least 10—15 years [17]. Thus the launch of 
the NPP is delayed until 2023—2028. 
Lithuanian observers believe that it will take some time to find a solution 
to the problem of commencing the Visaginas NPP construction. Meanwhile, a 
number of important questions arise. For instance, how will the Japanese in-
vestor react to such a delay? How will the financial aspect of the project be 
settled? Any delay leads to the obsolescence of the infrastructure remaining 
from the Ignalina NPP, which is one of Vilnius’s main trump cards in the issue 
of constructing a new NPP particularly in Lithuania and not in any other coun-
try. Lithuanian specialists in the field of nuclear energy are losing their quali-
fication. Finally, there are two other NPPs being constructed on the neighbour-
ing territories (in Belarus and the Kaliningrad region). One more question: to 
what extent will the power generated at Visaginas be competitive? 
One thing is clear: Lithuania will have to utilise the old NPP and build a 
new one in the near future. Will the country’s economy carry this burden? It 
cannot count on the EU support in constructing a new nuclear plant in the 
conditions when the funds for utilising the old one are insufficient. It is 
likely that the situation will require a new solution in foreign policy. 
One should take into account that Lithuania’s nuclear facilities (the to-
be-utilised and the planned ones) exist within the Russian innovation field. 
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The closed Ignalina NPP and its infrastructure were created by Soviet sci-
entists and employed cutting-edge technology. Even the dismantling of the 
old NPP is impossible without innovative solutions and approaches, which 
require research and technological cooperation with Russian firms and or-
ganisations. The construction of nuclear facilities involves the most ad-
vanced technology in general. As the new NPP will be constructed on the 
basis of the already existent infrastructure, cooperation with Russian ex-
perts is inevitable; however the Lithuanian leadership opposes the idea of 
any contacts in this sphere. Nevertheless, without innovative cooperation 
with other states, firms, and research institutions, it will be rather difficult 
for Lithuania to solve this nuclear problem. Mere ideological statements in 
the absence of advanced technologies provided by other participants of the 
common innovative process are not sufficient. Otherwise, it will cost a 
great deal. 
The events of spring 2013 show that the eastern vector of nuclear devel-
opment of Lithuanian energy is forming independently from the political 
views and sympathies of the authorities. 
Understanding that one can hardly hope for any improvement in the rela-
tions at the highest level, individual departments, businesses, politicians, and 
experts start establishing contacts to discuss the future of nuclear energy in 
the Baltic Sea region [see 8—10]. 
Lithuanian specialists are also forced to make these steps by their part-
ners — energy experts from Latvia and Estonia. If the political leadership of 
the Baltic States still plays the political game (under certain conditions the 
joint implementation of the Visaginas project seems to be possible), the re-
search, industrial, and business circles hold a more certain position. 
The mass media report that Latvia, for instance, has been conducting re-
search on the construction of its own NPP for several years. In this case, one 
might ask whether it is reasonable to invest in the Lithuanian economy, on 
whose territory the Visaginas NPP will be constructed, and then solve the 
problem of transmitting electricity from there. Possibly, Latvia will construct 
its own NPP of a small capacity (up to 400 MW). Estonia has already devel-
oped a project of constructing a 1000 MW NPP in the Muuga Lagoon [11]. 
Judging by the position of the parties, one can come to a conclusion that, 
in the near future, the Baltic States will hardly show unanimity regarding nu-
clear energy development. 
A meeting of 12 EU ministers, which took place on March 2013 in Lon-
don and focused on nuclear energy development issues, confirmed that the 
Europeans were ready for cooperation. However, the Baltic States were rep-
resented at the meeting only by Lithuania [12]. 
In view of the potential readiness of almost each state of the Baltic re-
gion to construct an NPP and the increasing tension over nuclear policy, sig-
nificant efforts towards the development of a common agenda are to be 
taken, regardless of the bloc and non-bloc interests of the countries involved. 
 
Editor’s note: While The Baltic Region was being prepared for print, 
certain events took place in Lithuania, which significantly changed the situa-
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tion around the construction of the new NPP. At the end of April, the repub-
lic’s leadership emphasised the need to reconsider the conditions of the 
forthcoming implementation of the Visaginas NPP construction project. First 
of all, the project has to be approved by the political parties and citizens. 
Also, there is a need to reduce the design costs of the NPP construction, 
which should entail a decrease in NPP-generated electricity charges. Finally, 
the Lithuanian leadership plans to increase the investment role of the Japa-
nese corporation Hitachi Nuclear, whereas Estonia and Latvia — as future 
partners — should take on a corresponding share of expenditure relating to 
preliminary works. Reactions to the changed construction conditions are to 
be expected in the second half of 2013. Experts believe that Lithuania can 
postpone indefinitely the implementation of the project. 
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